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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
A Financing Statement as a Security Agreement
Under the Uniform Commercial Code
Defendant Everett, in exchange for advances on crop production during
1969 on lands in two counties, delivered his promissory note for $75,000 to
plaintiff Evans. The note stipulated that it was "secured by Uniform Commer-
cial Code financing statement of North Carolina." On the following day the
plaintiff and the defendant filed identical financing statements in each county.
The financing statements, signed by both parties, contained the name and
address of the defendant as the "debtor" and of the plaintiff as the "secured
party." The statements also listed the types of collateral covered, describing
the collateral as the crops grown during 1969 on five specified farms and the
farm machinery on the land. The description was followed by the language,
"same securing note for advanced money to produce crops for the year 1969."
The note and financing statements were the only documents signed by Everett
indicating his indebtedness to the plaintiff. Everett, while still owing the plain-
tiff approximately $25,000, sold the crops described in the financing statements
to third parties. Plaintiff sued Everett and the third parties for the balance due
on the note, and attempted to establish a security interest in the crops sold. All
of the defendants except Everett and one of the third parties moved to dismiss
the action for the failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The motion was granted and the action against all of the other defendants was
dismissed. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment.! Held, reversed: A
financing statement containing the requirements of Uniform Commercial Code
§ 9-203' and manifesting an intention to grant a security interest is sufficient
as a security agreement. Evans v. Everett, 10 N.C.2d 435, 183 S.E.2d 109
(1971).
I. SECURITY INTERESTS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Creation, Attachment, and Perfection of a Security Interest. Before the de-
velopment and adoption of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, various
security devices were in use.' With certain exceptions the Code has replaced
such devices with the "security agreement."' Two documents are typically
created. The written security agreement "creates or provides for a security in-
terest," and the financing statement, which is designed to give notice of a
'Evans v. Everett, 10 N.C. App. 435, 179 S.E.2d 120 (1971).
'As of Dec. 1, 1970, all states except Louisiana had adopted the Code. NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 313 (1970).
' Pledges, trust receipts, chattel mortgages, and conditional sales contracts are examples.
No particular form of words was necessary to create a lien or constitute a chattel mortgage.
In fact, an oral mortgage was as sufficient "as if it had been in writing, provided, if reduced
to writing, it would have been valid." White Co. v. Carroll, 146 N.C. 230, 232-33, 59
S.E. 678, 679 (1907); accord, Kearns v. Davis Bros., 186 N.C. 522, 120 S.E. 52 (1923).
This same pre-code law was present in other jurisdictions. See Yeager v. Laredo Nat'l Bank,
146 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1940), error dismissed; Gordon v. Ball, 73
S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1934).4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-104, 9-203(1).
'Defined simply as an "agreement which creates or provides for a security interest." Id.
S 9-105(1) (h).6 1d.
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possible prior security interest to potential creditors, generally must be filed
to perfect that interest.
The security agreement is effective as evidence of a security interest if it
(a) is written,7 (b) is signed by the debtor,8 and (c) contains sufficient in-
formation regarding the specific collateral involved to enable the collateral to
be reasonably identified.! Furthermore, when the security interest covers crops
or oil, gas, or minerals to be extracted, or timber to be cut, a description of the
land concerned must be included." Once these requirements are met, a valid
security agreement has been properly executed. To be enforceable, however,
the security interest must attach to specific property. Attachment occurs when
a valid security agreement has been properly executed," the secured creditor
has given value," and the debtor has some ownership rights in the collateral.'"
The security agreement itself, however, is, in essence, only a contract between
the parties, and in most situations 4 does not protect the creditor from bona
fide purchasers.
Perfection of the security interest is achieved by filing a financing statement"
in a public office." "This filing serves as constructive notice to all that a se-
curity interest in the collateral exists as between the parties who sign the state-
ment. A financing statement may be filed in advance-before the security
agreement is made or the security interest attaches."'"
In North Carolina the secured party must file a financing statement in the
county of the debtor's residence and also in the county where the land on which
the crops are growing, or are to be grown, is located." The execution of a
valid security agreement and the proper preparation and filing of a financing
statement create and perfect the security interest.
Requisites of the Security Agreement. The security agreement, "which creates
or provides for a security interest,"" constitutes the written evidence of the
'It has been stated that the agreement could be oral, written, or even implied. "How-
ever, an oral or implied agreement is insufficient except in those transactions in which the
collateral, at the time of the agreement, is in possession of the secured party." J. RAPHAEL,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SIMPLIFIED 310 (1967).
'A security agreement is valid without the secured party's signature. See Nat'l Dime
Bank v. Cleveland Bros. Equip. Co., 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 511 (Dauphin Co. Ct. 1959). Thus,
the debtor's signature only is sufficient, but it is advisable that both be included.
9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-203 (1) (b).
10 Id.
"I ld. § 9-204(1). See also Meek, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 18 ARK. L. REV. 30 (1964).
12UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(1). This causes problems in the case of the
"floating lien." See Wyatt, The Floating Lien Under the U.C.C., 5 AM. Bus. L.J. 293
(1967).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(1).
'" See id. § 9-302 for exceptions, including provisions of S 4-208 on security interest of
collecting bank and § 9-113 on security interest arising under art. 2 ("Sales").
"See id. § 9-402, stating that:
A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and the secured
party, gives an address of the secured party from which information concern-
ing the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the
debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items,
of collateral.
16 Id. § 9-401.
'7 J. RAPHAEL, supra note 7, at 328.
"8N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 25-9-401(1)(a) (1965).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105(1) (h).
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security interest. It also will suffice as a financing statement if it meets the
formal requisites of a financing statement."0 The Code does not, however,
specifically provide that a financing statement may serve as a security agree-
ment.
In American Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co.' a debtor corporation executed a
promissory note to claimants. Later, a financing statement was properly filed
in accordance with section 9-402 of the Code. Insolvency of the debtor followed
and receivers were appointed. Claimants asserted a security interest in equip-
ment designated as collateral in the financing statement. The Supreme Court
of Rhode Island held that the financing statement was not a security agreement,
and, therefore, was not enforceable under section 9-203 of the Code.2 "[Ilt is
not possible for a financing statement which does not contain the debtor's
grant of a security interest to serve as a security agreement."'
American Card provided guidelines for later cases in which a financing
statement had been filed but there was no formally executed security agree-
ment. In In re Freeze the court stated:
While Article 9 of the Code has stripped the formal requirements of a security
agreement to the bone, certain minimal requirements must be observed. A
security agreement signed by the debtor containing a description of the col-
lateral (and in some instances real estate) is a must where the collateral is in
the debtor's possession. Under Article 9 a financing statement may be filed by
the parties in the anticipation of a loan, which is never consummated. The
mere filing of a financing statement, therefore, does not necessarily indicate
that a security interest exists.'
In the relatively recent decision of In re Nottingham the court stated that
"[tihere are no magic words that create a security interest. There must be
language, however, in the instrument which when read and construed leads
to the logical conclusion that it was the intention of the parties that a security
interest be created."' This requirement of a granting clause has met with strong
objection by some writers on the Code. One such commentator has noted that
nothing in the Code requires that a security agreement contain such a clause."0
However, as pointed out in In re Walter Willis, Inc.,"7 the prevailing case law
20 Id. § 9-402.
2197 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963).
21 196 A.2d at 152.
3 Id.
242 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 656, 658-59 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
256 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1197, 1199 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTEREST IN PERSONAL PROPERTY S 11.4 (1965). Gilmore
attacks the American Card decision, calling it "an unfortunate decision." Commenting on
the granting clause issue, he states:
Certainly, nothing in § 9-203 requires that the 'security agreement' contain
a granting clause. The § 9-402 financing statement contained all that was
necessary to satisfy the § 9-203 statute of frauds as well as being sufficient
evidence of the parties' intention to create a security interest in the tools and
dies. No doubt the court would have upheld the security interest if the debtor
had signed two pieces of paper instead of one. The S 9-402 provision that
a short financing statement may be filed in place of the full security agree-
ment was designed to simplify the operation. The Rhode Island court gives
it an effect reminiscent of the worst formal requisites holding under the
nineteenth century chattel mortgage acts.
Id. at 347-48.
"313 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Ohio 1970). This case actually held that a security agree-
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is in accord with Nottingham, requiring a granting clause for the existence of
a security agreement.
A 1968 decision, In re Center Auto Parts," dealt with a financing statement
and promissory note, and focused on the question of what language was suffi-
cient to grant a security interest. The court concluded:
[T]he Financing Statement, though it is signed by the debtors and contains a
description of the property, does not standing alone allow a priority for a valid
security interest since the financing statement filed in the office of the Secretary
of State did not contain the debtor's grant of security interest. However, the
note does in fact 'create and provide for a security interest.' Its language is
clear that a security interest was to be granted by the execution of the note for
it states, 'This note is secured by a certain financing statement.'
The importance of In re Center Auto Parts was its holding that such terse
language would indicate a grant of a security interest. However, it should be
recognized that both the note and financing statement were necessary in order
to dispense with the formally executed security agreement.
II. EVANS v. EVERETT
The Supreme Court of North Carolina faced a case of first impression in
Evans v. Everett, and took an analytical approach to the question of whether
the "financing statement executed by plaintiff and defendant Everett [could]
also serve as a security agreement."3 To resolve the issue, the court considered
the formal requisites and definitions of "security interest" and "security agree-
ment," 1 the opinions of commentators, and the decisions in prior cases. The
problem the court faced was to decide whether the language of the financing
statement fulfilled the requirement of a grant of a security interest. This prob-
lem went to the basic question of what language is required to make a security
agreement.
The plaintiff's argument rested simply on the contention that the language
in the financing statements and accompanying note was sufficient to grant a
security interest, and that this language, when coupled with the other require-
ments, evidenced a valid security agreement. The plaintiff argued that, as in
Center Auto Parts," the language in the financing statement and note mani-
fested the intent of the parties to create a security interest.
Defendant based his argument on the statement in American Card that it
"is not possible for a financing statement which does not contain the debtor's
grant of a security interest to serve as a security agreement,"' and argued that
ment was present. The court's decision was distinguished from the other cases because a
lease was involved, and the court thought that this fact made a substantial difference.
28 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1968).29 id. at 399.
o10 N.C.2d 435, 183 S.E.2d 109, 111 (1971).
31Id. at 112. The court noted that "the Code distinguishes between a security agreement
and financing statement."
32 For the requirements of a security agreement, see text accompanying notes 7-10 supra.
33 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 399, stating: "This note is secured by a certain financial state-
ment."
24 196 A.2d at 152.
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the language in the financing statement and note was insufficient as a grant of
a security interest.
Justice Sharp, speaking for the court, held that the financing statement was
sufficient to serve as a security agreement. In rejecting the defendant's argu-
ment, the court stated that the "Rhode Island court [in American Card] was of
the opinion that technical words of conveyance from the debtor to the secured
party were required to create a security interest."' The court did not accept
this view, stating that "no magic words" were necessary to create such an
interest.' The court accepted the plaintiff's argument and adopted the reasoning
in Center Auto Parts. The court added that recent cases "uniformly hold that
a financing statement does not ordinarily create a security interest. . . .[How-
ever,) a financing statement may double as a security agreement if it contains
appropriate language which grants a security interest." 7 Having held that the
financing statement contained language clearly manifesting the debtor's intent
to grant, create, and provide for a security interest, the court held that there
was a valid security agreement.
III. CONCLUSION
In reaching its decision the court warned that "this financing statement meets
[only) the Code's minimum requirements," and that such draftsmanship will
likely "produce litigation."" The court listed some other requirements for a
security agreement which one commentator has suggested." Such warnings
are helpful to the creditor who has a security interest in property and wishes
clearly and easily to establish the interest through a security agreement. Con-
sidering the decision in the case, a stronger warning should have been directed
to the debtor and third party purchasers.
In a typical situation the debtor and creditor anticipate a security arrange-
ment. Since a financing statement merely indicates that a security interest has
been or will be created, and the Code allows the financing statement to be filed
before the security interest is actually created, the debtor and creditor may de-
cide to file a financing statement first. After filing, however, the debtor and
creditor may have problems in negotiation and one party may decide not to
enter into a formal security agreement. Following the court's decision in Evans
v. Everett, the proposed creditor could possibly establish a security interest in
the debtor's property based on a filed financing statement containing language
merely referring to the proposed security interest.
A similar dilemma may be experienced by the innocent third party who
3 183 S.E.2d at 113.
38Id. The court cited In re Nottingham, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1197 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
37183 S.E.2d at 113 (emphasis by the court). See also Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 9, 42-44,
46-48 (1970).
33 183 S.E.2d at 114 (emphasis by the court).
"
9 ld.; see 25 U. PiTT. L. REv. 619, 621 (1964): (1) The names and addresses of
both the secured party and the debtor; (2) a description of the collateral; (3) a descrip-
tion of the underlying obligation for which the security was given; (4) a recital of the
rights and liabilities of each party on default; (5) the signature of each party; and (6)
any other provisions necessary to meet the exigencies of the individual transaction. See form
suggested in MASSACHUSETTS BANKERS ASSOCIATION, BANKERS MANUAL ON THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 168 (1958).
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